Global Power Play? Why a Trump-Xi-Putin Summit Won't Redraw World Borders

Next week, a significant meeting is anticipated on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (Apec) summit in Shenzhen, involving Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Donald Trump, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. This encounter, confirmed by all three governments, has been labeled with two potent words: “historic” and “Yalta”.

The descriptor “historic” stems from the unprecedented nature of a formal trilateral meeting between these three heads of state. The comparison to “Yalta,” however, carries a more cautionary tone, evoking the 1945 conference in Crimea where the “big three” – British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US President Franklin Roosevelt, and Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin – shaped the post-World War II European landscape. Critics drawing this parallel suggest the upcoming meeting could lead to a division of the world among the three leaders, a notion the article argues is alarmist.

The article contends that viewing current events through the lens of World War II ignores the distinct realities of our present era. In 1945, the US alone accounted for approximately 50% of global GDP; today, that figure is halved. While the US, China, and Russia remain great powers, the world is increasingly multipolar, with middle powers and coalitions of smaller nations exerting greater agency. The fact that the meeting is scheduled during an Apec summit, an organization with 21 member states, exemplifies this shift.

While Trump and Putin might entertain the idea of agreed-upon “spheres of influence,” Chinese officials have explicitly rejected the term. The article acknowledges that great powers inevitably influence their neighbors, but points out that neither the US nor Russia has had unqualified success in their respective “near abroads” recently. Trump’s preferred candidate, Flavio Bolsonaro, lost Brazil’s presidential election to Lula da Silva, and Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine has not achieved its initial objectives.

The piece dismisses fears of a new Stalinist-style expansionism, noting China’s emphasis on peaceful rise and its lack of recent warfare. It also contextualizes Putin’s remarks about the Soviet Union’s demise, highlighting his statements that he does not seek its restoration. Concerns that Trump might concede too much on issues like nuclear weapons or Ukraine are also addressed. China has stated it is unrealistic to expect participation in trilateral nuclear disarmament talks at this stage, and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier reported that Xi Jinping indicated Ukraine is a European issue for Europeans to resolve.

Instead of focusing on potential negative outcomes, the article suggests considering positive possibilities, such as cooperation on AI governance or resolving the conflict with Iran. A proposal from Da Wei, a professor at Tsinghua University, is mentioned: encouraging Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues involving scholars, officials, and civil society actors from China, Russia, and the US. Such dialogues, the author attests from personal experience, can foster mutual understanding through off-the-record discussions among former diplomats and ministers.

The article concludes by noting the uncertainty surrounding the meeting’s format, with Beijing reportedly favoring prepared statements and predetermined outcomes, while Washington prefers flexibility. Ultimately, if the meeting occurs, its significance may be largely symbolic. It would be remarkable and historic in its own right, but the world of 2023 is not 1945, and the fate of continents is unlikely to be decided in Shenzhen. As Sigmund Freud might suggest, sometimes a meeting is simply a meeting.