Beyond the War: Building a Lasting Security Framework for the Gulf

Gulf defence ministers have taken a significant step towards collective security by approving the establishment of a forward command in Kuwait under the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Unified Military Command, with forces to be allocated. This decision, made on November 10, signifies a growing commitment among Gulf states to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security. The move follows remarks by US President Donald Trump after a meeting with Qatar’s prime minister, where he stated, “Iran militarily is effectively over,” and indicated the continuation of the US blockade with the possibility of further military action. While any diplomatic opening warrants support, even a lasting agreement would not resolve the fundamental security challenges facing the Gulf. The effectiveness of the new Kuwait command will hinge on its implementation and integration with existing regional security partnerships. The core issue lies in abandoning the notion that a single, overarching security arrangement can address all regional threats, as this presumes a level of consensus on adversaries, priorities, and acceptable risks that is currently absent. The diverse threats, including Iran’s attacks on Gulf states during the recent war, Israel’s strike on Qatar in September 2025, armed militias, terrorist groups, cyberattacks, maritime disruption, and the potential for state failure in neighbouring regions, underscore the complexity of the security landscape. The diminishing international restraints on the use of force further complicate these challenges.

A more viable response involves a layered and networked security architecture, a direction Gulf states are already pursuing. The immediate task is to ensure these arrangements function cohesively and are sustained beyond the immediate pressures of the ongoing conflict. Layering begins with acknowledging that different partnerships serve distinct purposes. Foundational elements include national capabilities and cooperation within the GCC. The relationship with the United States remains crucial, supplemented by additional arrangements to address needs unmet by a single partner. Operational coordination is enhanced through cooperation with US Central Command, exemplified by the air and missile defence coordination cell established at Al Udeid in January to improve regional coordination, threat warning sharing, and contingency preparedness. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, introduces a collective defence commitment among its signatories. Furthermore, the Badr memorandum, signed in October by Qatar, Turkiye, Pakistan, and Indonesia, outlines cooperation in defence manufacturing, research, and technical training. The value of these initiatives should be assessed by the security gaps they effectively fill, recognizing that collective defence, operational coordination, and industrial capacity are complementary, not interchangeable. For instance, acquiring an interceptor, producing its components, and determining its deployment in a crisis are distinct challenges.

The next critical step is to interconnect these layers, enabling capabilities developed through one partnership to bolster those available through others, thereby creating a networked architecture. Qatar serves as a pertinent example: its GCC membership and participation in the Badr agreement alongside Turkiye and Pakistan connect it to the Mecca signatories through various channels, despite not being a direct party to the Mecca agreement. These interconnections offer opportunities for enhanced capabilities, such as improved production capacity or better coordination among shared partners, which can benefit Qatar through its existing relationships. A stronger deterrent against attacks on neighbouring states could also contribute to a more stable regional security environment. However, these benefits are contingent upon deliberate cooperation, as Qatar does not automatically gain a Mecca guarantee through association. The flow of information, equipment, and expertise through a network requires explicit governmental agreement. Consequently, these connections demand as much attention as the agreements themselves.

This networked approach aligns with the broader interests of a diverse group of nations, including European states, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Pakistan, all of whom have a stake in resisting a world dominated by the arbitrary use of force and politically motivated trade disruptions. While energy exporters and importers face different consequences from shipping disruptions, both require open trade routes. Countries do not need identical political systems or relationships with Washington to recognize the perils of an increasingly unpredictable international order. A diplomatic foundation for cooperation already exists, with the EU and GCC jointly advocating for freedom of navigation through Hormuz, and ASEAN and GCC ministers reaffirming sovereignty, the protection of civilian infrastructure, and the necessity of diplomacy. These nations should actively champion the fundamental rules underpinning their prosperity, leveraging their collective economic, technological, and diplomatic resources to support rules that individual states struggle to uphold. The same networks facilitating infrastructure protection can also support coordinated diplomacy when these rules are violated. Credibility necessitates consistency; sovereignty must be upheld regardless of whether the aggressor is a partner or an adversary, civilian protection must extend to Palestine, Ukraine, and the Gulf, and mediation must remain a viable option even with politically inconvenient parties. Operationally, the immediate priority is to integrate existing security arrangements. Gulf governments and their partners should establish protocols for sharing threat warnings across different arrangements, defining deployable capabilities, and clarifying authority for requesting assistance. Joint exercises are essential to test these connections under pressure, including scenarios where a partner cannot participate. A subsequent priority is safeguarding critical societal infrastructure, such as energy and water facilities, ports, and communication networks, through sustained cooperation on protection and repair. A partnership capable of rapidly restoring essential services directly enhances security, even without a mutual defence clause. Diplomacy aimed at de-escalation must constitute a distinct layer, with necessary channels to Iran, mechanisms for preventing maritime incidents, and escalation management systems remaining vital alongside robust defence capabilities. Gulf states should utilize any openings presented by current negotiations to pursue reciprocal, verifiable restraint. This comprehensive security architecture would provide a practical framework for cooperation among Gulf, European, and Asian partners, allowing them to contribute based on their capacities and willingness, whether in defence technology, maritime expertise, industrial production, financing, or diplomatic access.

The inherent challenge lies in the sovereignty of each participant. Gulf states possess divergent interests, and external partners face varying constitutional requirements, domestic pressures, and geopolitical relationships. Some constraints are permanent, while others are subject to political shifts. A government willing to share intelligence might be hesitant to deploy forces, and another might support maritime protection but oppose land operations. Understanding these limitations beforehand is crucial for effective crisis planning. Overlapping partnerships also carry risks, including duplicated efforts, unrealistic expectations, or unintended involvement in disputes. Clear responsibilities and consultation procedures are paramount; adding agreements without defining their outcomes would increase complexity without enhancing security. Furthermore, this architecture should not be presented as a guarantor of perpetual peace, as the region's rivalries and political grievances are unlikely to vanish with increased cooperation. A more realistic objective is relative peace and security—characterized by reduced opportunities for coercion, contained crises, and diminished exposure of civilian life to conflict. This entails decreasing the frequency and impact of violence while continuing to pursue durable settlements, ensuring that a state of permanent emergency does not become the norm. Gulf states should seize this moment to consolidate their partnerships, bolster their capabilities, and establish clearer limits on escalation, aiming for a region where more partners can act collectively and fewer crises escalate into widespread conflict.