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Poland's Constitutional Crisis: A Win for Putin as Institutions Erode

Al Jazeera EnglishNovember 13, 2026 at 07:45 AM0 views
Poland's Constitutional Crisis: A Win for Putin as Institutions Erode

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This story, titled "The real winner in Poland’s constitutional battle is Putin" First published on Al Jazeera English and was retrieved from its original source on November 13, 2026.

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Warsaw, Poland – A fierce struggle for control of Poland's Constitutional Tribunal is escalating between the nation's two dominant political factions, each asserting their commitment to the rule of law. However, this internal conflict is significantly diminishing the Polish state's credibility among its own citizens, a development that plays directly into Vladimir Putin's strategic interests. The origins of this dispute trace back over a decade.

In 2015, the outgoing parliament, then controlled by the center-right Civic Platform, attempted to appoint judges to the Constitutional Tribunal for vacancies that were rightfully designated for the incoming parliament. The subsequent conservative Law and Justice government exploited this controversy to accelerate its agenda of appointing party loyalists rather than independent jurists to the Tribunal. Now, with Civic Platform back in power, they are endeavoring to install new judges. However, President Karol Nawrocki and the Tribunal's leadership, both aligned with Law and Justice, have obstructed the seating of several newly appointed judges. Last month, one of the newly elected judges ordered the suspension of the Tribunal's president and deputy, leading to the deployment of police to the building. Nawrocki condemned the action as an attempted hostile takeover, while Prime Minister Donald Tusk defended it as a necessary step to reinstate the rule of law.

Moscow has already capitalized on this confrontation, casting doubt on the integrity of Poland's institutions. On November 3, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev characterized the intervention as a "coup." A decade ago, it was the conservative Law and Justice government that engaged in packing the Constitutional Tribunal with party nominees, disregarding legal protocols. Today, the coalition comprising the center-right Civic Platform and the liberal Left is acting in a manner that is also being described as unlawful. The primary political parties are increasingly mirroring each other's tactics. Law and Justice is now urging its supporters to protest in defense of the rule of law, a slogan previously employed by the liberal opposition when Law and Justice held power. Currently, it is the liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk who is adopting a strongman persona, with police in riot gear deployed around the Constitutional Tribunal. He portrays himself as an effective leader, unconcerned with legal nuances or the doubts raised by some liberal-leaning experts.

Amidst this backdrop, an image of Tusk reading an issue of the philosophical journal Kronos, which focused on Carl Schmitt, has gained significant traction on social media. Schmitt, a proponent of decisionism, famously stated, "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."

Law and Justice's prior efforts to politicize the Constitutional Tribunal mobilized middle-aged liberal supporters in major cities a decade ago. It appears unlikely, however, that Poles will once again take to the streets in massive numbers to support either political bloc. The public is weary of the political infighting, not only due to the considerable hypocrisy displayed by both major blocs when invoking the rule of law while resorting to force, but also because the dispute fails to address citizens' primary concerns: the cost of living and national security in the face of an aggressive neighbor engaged in a hot war and a hybrid and cognitive war within the country.

What has changed dramatically compared to the protests a decade ago, when the main political forces occupied opposing but similar positions, is the geopolitical context: Russia's full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine, coupled with its hybrid and information warfare aimed at undermining Poland's international standing. In a worst-case scenario, this struggle over institutional legitimacy could extend to electoral processes. A precedent can be observed in Romania, where, on December 6, 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election following intelligence reports of alleged foreign interference, social media manipulation, and campaign financing irregularities, ordering a repeat of the electoral process.

What may unfold in other Central and Eastern European nations, including Poland if the situation deteriorates, is the liberal establishment employing measures that override electoral outcomes, such as courts invalidating elections in response to genuine foreign interference via social media campaigns. Conversely, the opposition might increasingly adopt an anti-establishment stance, effectively delegitimizing state institutions. The problem is exacerbated by the possibility that foreign interference could be genuine rather than fabricated by the establishment. These two opposing forces are constricting the democratic middle ground: on one side, social media platforms influenced by foreign superpowers, algorithmically manipulating public emotions and fostering distrust in the state; on the other, the decisionism of an establishment governing in a state of exception through politically subservient courts. Both scenarios leave diminished space for thoughtful civic self-determination.

A significant portion of Poland's commentators still perceive this dynamic as another iteration of the familiar two-party rivalry between Civic Platform's EU-aligned liberals and the US-backed conservative Law and Justice party. Beyond this rivalry, Russia- and China-influenced, ostensibly anti-establishment radical influencers and parties, both anti-European and anti-American, aim to portray the state as a foreign occupation. The more extreme the theories delegitimizing the state become, the more pretexts the ruling establishment will have to delegitimize the opposition.

The danger is no longer merely one political bloc gaining control of the Constitutional Tribunal at the expense of another. It is that, as both sides continue to erode the legitimacy of state institutions, a growing number of Poles may cease to view these institutions as their own. What is being weakened is not just the authority of a particular government, but the fundamental bond between citizens and the state itself. No one would be more pleased by this self-reinforcing dynamic, which diminishes Poland's standing, than Vladimir Putin.

If any form of resolution is possible, it will not originate from the current political forces.

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