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Why Red Sea Security Depends on the Restoration of the Yemeni State

Al Jazeera EnglishNovember 16, 2026 at 07:54 AM0 views
Why Red Sea Security Depends on the Restoration of the Yemeni State

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This story, titled "The Red Sea cannot be secured without restoring the Yemeni state" First published on Al Jazeera English and was retrieved from its original source on November 16, 2026.

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For a decade, the Yemen civil war was viewed as a regional conflict confined to the southern Arabian Peninsula. However, recent escalations in 2024-2025 have demonstrated that the conflict now has global implications, disrupting international trade and impacting the strategic interests of major powers. The ability of the Iran-backed Houthis to threaten maritime transit through the Bab al-Mandeb strait—one of the world's most critical corridors—is a direct result of the collapse of Yemeni state institutions and the proliferation of armed factions.

The security of navigation cannot be achieved through naval task forces and aircraft carriers alone. A sustainable solution requires addressing the root causes of the Yemen crisis. The international community largely failed to prevent Yemen's disintegration, and some actions even facilitated the Houthi seizure of Sanaa in September 2014. This coup ended the post-2011 transition and established a parallel armed authority that controls strategic territory, including the highlands overlooking the Red Sea and the approaches to Bab al-Mandeb.

The Houthis inherited the military capabilities of a state once ranked as the fifth most heavily armed in the Arab world. This combination of state capacity, territorial control, and external sponsorship has made the Houthi threat more durable than that of ISIS or al-Qaeda. Despite this, the international community has often treated the Houthis as a force to be contained or negotiated with, rather than prioritizing the restoration of national institutions. For example, the 2018 Stockholm Agreement regarding Hodeidah secured a ceasefire but ultimately entrenched the Houthis as the de facto authority over the city and port.

Further failures occurred in 2021 when the Joint Forces on the Western Coast—a coalition supporting the internationally recognized Yemeni government—withdrew inexplicably, allowing the Houthis to solidify their grip on the Hodeidah governorate. This episode highlighted the lack of coordination between the anti-Houthi front, the Yemeni government, and the regional coalition. Instead of building a unified national army under the defence ministry, the coalition allowed local formations to emerge, such as the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council, which further divided the anti-Houthi camp.

Today, the world faces a militia armed with ballistic, drones, and potentially hypersonic missiles, using its coastline to blackmail major waterways. While naval deployments can intercept missiles, they cannot eliminate the conditions that allow these attacks to be launched from Yemeni territory. Red Sea security is inseparable from the security of the bordering states. With 2,500km of coastline along the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, Yemen's crisis must be treated as a matter of state sovereignty and institutions.

A serious strategy must prioritize the restoration of the national-state project, the unification of military forces under a single national command, and the ending of multiple power centers. Political settlements should only follow the defeat of armed groups like the Houthis. All Gulf states, including the UAE, must recognize that their own stability depends on restoring the Yemeni state. The international community must understand that restoring the Yemeni state is a strategic global interest, not just a local concern.

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